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ARGUMENTS 
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust was terminated pursuant to his own actions 
and representations. Even if his beneficial interest was not terminated, however, Tracy is 
not entitled to claim an interest in pre-Complaint distributions or to assert that Phillip 
breached his fiduciary duties since Phillip acted pursuant to the directive given to Phillip 
by the Decree of Divorce issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991 and to the 
express, written directions of Tracy himself. 
I. TRACY TERMINATED HIS STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE 
TRUST. 
Tracy terminated his interest in the Trust by either (a) executing a Waiver and 
Assignment that substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute; (b) waiving his 
beneficial interest in the Trust; or (c) agreeing to a mutual modification of the Trust. 
A. Substantial Compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute. 
Tracy does not dispute that his Wavier and Assignment strictly complied with the 
first three provisions of the Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver 
and Assignment. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 7-8. Tracy also does not dispute that his 
Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the fourth and final provision of the 
relevant version of the Disclaimer Statute. See id. Instead, Tracy asserts that all four 
provisions of the 1991 version of the Disclaimer Statute require strict compliance to 
effectuate a valid disclaimer. See id. 
However, the sole basis cited by Tracy in support of his assertion is an out-of-
context statement taken from a case dealing with the failure of a beneficiary to even 
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substantially comply with an amended version of the disclaimer statute. See id. In 
Faulkner, the beneficiary of a trust "accepted various items from the trust, including 
television equipment and household items, a kiln, and an opal ring." Whitney v. 
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, If 3, 95 P.3d 270. After accepting these items from the trust, the 
beneficiary executed a document entitled "Renunciation of Interest" purporting to 
"renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all [his] right, title, interest, or claim as a 
beneficiary of the [trust]." Id. at ffl[ 3-6 (emphasis added). 
Although the disclaimer statute in force at that time provided for partial 
disclaimers, it also provided that "[t]he right to disclaim property or an interest therein is 
barred by an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it." Id. at f 12 
(quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-80 l(5)(c) (Supp. 2003)). Based upon these facts and 
law, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he disclaimer was ineffective as a total 
disclaimer because he accepted property from the trust, and as a partial disclaimer 
because it did not accurately describe the interest to be disclaimed." Id. at f 14. 
In addressing the beneficiary's substantial compliance argument, the court found 
that "by accepting property from the trust, he failed to comply with the third provision" 
of the disclaimer statute, which the court described as "the acceptance of no benefit from 
the interest sought to be disclaimed." Id. at f 13. Consequently "[his] compliance with 
the statute [did] not depend on whether he substantially complied with the partial 
disclaimer provisions." Id. 
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Accordingly, the court found that not only had the beneficiary failed to strictly 
comply with the applicable statutory provision; he also failed to even substantially 
comply with the statutory provision. As a result, the court noted that "[the beneficiary's] 
substantial compliance argument simply ignores both the language of the statute and 
of the document he executed." Id. at ^ 14. This is the statement taken out of context by 
Tracy in arguing that "Phillip's position was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court." See 
Tracy's Reply Brief at 7. According to Tracy, "[t]he Utah Supreme Court stated that 
'substantial compliance' with this disclaimer statute, rather than strict compliance, 
"simply ignores both the language of the statute and of the document...'" See id. 
Putting the statement back in context, however, reveals that the court was not 
making an across-the-board statement that strict compliance was required of all of the 
provisions of the disclaimer statute. The court was clearly rejecting the substantial 
compliance argument made by that particular beneficiary in that particular case since the 
beneficiary did not even substantially comply with a provision of the relevant disclaimer 
statute. Given that the beneficiary failed to even substantially comply with the statutory 
provision, it was not necessary for the court to determine whether substantial compliance 
was sufficient to satisfy the provision or whether strict compliance was required. 
Furthermore, Faulkner involved an amended version of the disclaimer statute. 
The version of the Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and 
Assignment provides in relevant part, "[t]he disclaimer shall: £i) describe the property or 
interest in it disclaimed; {ii) declare the disclaimer and extent of it; j[iii} be signed by the 
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disclaimant; and j(iv} state that the disclaimer is proper under Subsection (4), and was 
made within the required time limits." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(l)(b) (1991) 
(emphasis added). In contrast, the version of the disclaimer statute at issue in Faulkner 
provided, "[t]he disclaimer shall: £a} describe the property or interest disclaimed; fb) 
declare the disclaimer and extent thereof; and {c} be signed by the disclaimant." See 
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \ 9, 95 P.3d 270; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-801(3) (Supp. 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the fourth provision of the 1991 version of the Disclaimer Statute— 
the only provision with which Tracy's Wavier and Assignment did not strictly comply— 
was no longer included in the statute when Faulkner was decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Consequently, it cannot be argued that the Utah Supreme Court ruled on whether 
a valid disclaimer could be effectuated pursuant to the 1991 version of the Disclaimer 
Statute based upon strict compliance with its first three provisions and substantial 
compliance with its fourth provision: the fourth provision simply was not at issue. 
In this case, Tracy does not dispute that his Wavier and Assignment strictly 
complied with the first three provisions of the applicable version of the Disclaimer 
Statute and substantially complied with its fourth and final provision. For the reasons set 
forth in Phillip's Opening Brief and herein, this Court should find that Tracy's status as a 
beneficiary of the Trust ceased when Phillip accepted the Waiver and Assignment into 
the Trust and reverse the trial court's conclusion to the contrary. 
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B. Waiver. 
Utah Code § 75-2-802 (1991) provides a means whereby an individual can 
terminate his or her interest in a testamentary transfer of property. However, it does not 
contain any language indicating that compliance with its provisions is the only way to 
terminate an interest in a testamentary transfer. In fact, subsection (5) expressly provides, 
"[t]his section does not abridge the right of persons to waive, release, assign, convey, 
disclaim, or renounce property or an interest in it under any other statute." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §75-2-802(5) (1991). 
Although Tracy argues that subsection (5) was only intended to limit the 
application of the Disclaimer Statute to testamentary dispositions, an interpretation of 
subsection (5) to that effect ignores its plain language and would render it meaningless 
since subsection (l)(a) already addresses the extent to which the Disclaimer Statute is 
applicable to property dispositions. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 8; UTAH CODE ANN. § 
75-2-802(5) (1991) ("A person . . . who is a . . . beneficiary under a nontestamentary 
instrument or contract... may disclaim in whole or in part the right of transfer to the 
person of any property or interest in it by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under 
this section.").1 
1
 In any event, whether the Disclaimer Statute is applicable to other property dispositions 
in addition to those of a testamentary nature is irrelevant to whether another statute 
provides a means whereby individuals can rid themselves of testamentary dispositions. 
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Tracy's unsupported assertion that subsection (5) is "introductory language" that 
only "applies to transfers and dispositions other than [testamentary dispositions]" is 
similarly without merit. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 8. As an initial matter, subsection (5) 
cannot be trivialized as "introductory language." It follows provisions describing a 
means of disclaiming a testamentary disposition and is clearly intended to be substantive. 
"When examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term 
advisedly." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8, 52 P.3d 1276. Consequently, "effect 
must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute." State v. 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1f 53, 63 P.3d 621. 
Furthermore, while the language of subsection (5) certainly applies to transfers 
and dispositions of property other than testamentary dispositions, there is simply nothing 
in subsection (5) or any other subsection of the Disclaimer Statute purporting to elevate 
the Disclaimer Statute into a position of being the only means whereby individuals can 
rid themselves of testamentary dispositions. Contrary to Tracy's assertion, allowing an 
interest in a testamentary disposition to be waived pursuant to the principals of equity, as 
codified in Utah Code § 75-7-106, does not render the Disclaimer Statute meaningless. 
"The usual effect of the disclaimer statute is to avoid the imposition of transfer 
taxes and to thwart creditors." Whitney v. Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \ 14, 95 P.3d 270. It 
makes sense that the legislature would provide a statutory means of disclaiming an 
interest in a testamentary disposition by which an individual can be assured that he or she 
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will not be subject to transfer taxes and the disclaimed interest will not be subject to the 
claims of creditors. 
It also makes sense for the legislature to provide an alternative means of riding 
oneself of an interest in a testamentary disposition for those not concerned with avoiding 
transfer taxes or thwarting creditors.2 Why not allow "persons to waive, release, assign, 
convey, disclaim, or renounce" an interest in a testamentary disposition pursuant to 
compliance with the terms of another statute if avoiding transfer taxes and thwarting 
creditors is not the goal? See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991).3 
The Utah Supreme Court recently observed, "[t]he mere fact that the legislature 
may have provided an avenue of relief for a particular injury does not preclude alternative 
methods of recovery for that same, or a similar, injury absent some evidence that the 
legislature intended that its statutory remedy be the sole avenue of relief." Ashby v. 
Ashby, 2010 UT 7, T| 25, 227 P.3d 246. Just as the legislature does not render an avenue 
2
 There are numerous reasons one may desire to disclaim or refuse an interest in a trust 
other than to thwart creditors or avoid transfer taxes. These include complying with the 
wishes of a settlor (particularly if the settlor is a parent or other close relative), avoiding 
involvement in an anticipated lawsuit over the assets, not needing the interest and/or 
desiring that someone else receive it or benefit from it. 
3
 This also applies to Phillip's substantial compliance argument. It seems that if strict 
compliance is the standard, it should only apply to those transfers intended to avoid 
creditors and/or transfer taxes, both of which affect the rights of third parties, e.g. 
creditors and the government. In the present case, however, Tracy's waiver or disclaimer 
carried no such purpose or effect. Accordingly, requiring strict compliance in this case is 
only an exercise in raising form over substance in order to prop up the purpose or policy 
behind the statute, which, in the end, has no application to this case. 
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of relief for a particular injury meaningless by not making it the sole avenue of relief, the 
legislature did not render the Disclaimer Statute meaningless by allowing individuals to 
rid themselves of a beneficial interest in a testamentary disposition by effectuating a 
waiver, release, assignment, conveyance, disclaimer, or renunciation pursuant to 
compliance with another statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991). 
In fact, it is not uncommon for the legislature to provide alternative means of 
accomplishing the same result. See, e.g., Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, f 25,227 P.3d 246; 
Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, fflf 11-13, 52 P.3d 1148 (describing two 
"alternative" statutory methods to effectuate an annexation); Cole v. Jordan School Dist., 
899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995) ("The legislature amended section 63-30-11 to provide 
minors with an alternative to filing a notice of claim within one year.. . ."); City 
Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1991) ("In 1961, the Utah 
legislature enacted the Utah Trust Deed Act, which provided an alternative to the 
mortgage foreclosure process.55); State v. Judd, 493 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah 1972) ("The 
legislature has acknowledged the unique circumstances of the mother or pregnant woman 
and offered her two alternative remedies.55); Hess v. Udy, 185 P. 367, 368 (Utah 1919) 
(noting "the wisdom of the Legislature in providing an efficient alternative remedy that 
can be resorted to at the option of the party injured55). 
Providing alternative means of accomplishing the same result does not render one 
of the means meaningless, especially when, like those seeking to rid themselves of a 
testamentary disposition, the result may be sought for differing reasons. In this case, 
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Tracy waived his beneficial interest in the Trust either when he signed the Waiver and 
Assignment or when he drafted and sent the letters to Phillip and Robert. With respect to 
the letters to Phillip and Robert, Tracy argues that the inclusion of certain language in the 
letters regarding whether he signed the Waiver and Assignment evidences that Tracy did 
not intend to relinquish his interest in the Trust by drafting and sending the letters. See 
Tracy's Reply Brief at 8. However, a thorough examination of the letters clearly 
evidences that Tracy was attempting both to waive his interest in the Trust and cast doubt 
on whether he signed the Wavier and Assignment. In his letter to Phillip, Tracy wrote the 
following: 
No, I'm not going to do anything about that Estate. It's not worth it to me. I'm 
not that small of a person. 
So, I guess the two of you can do what you want. 
You did say that I signed some paper. I don't remember if I did or didn't 
I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody else, for that 
matter would intentionally and knowingly sign away there [sic] inheritance? No, 
and neither would you. 
Like I said, I'm not going to do anything about the estate. 
See Letter from Tracy to Phillip; Addendum Exhibit "E". Similarly, Tracy wrote to 
Robert the following: 
First of all, I'm not going to do anything about the estate. I'm not that small of a 
person, so I guess the two of you can do what you want. 
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I don't remember whether I signed anything or not Do you think I would 
intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would you? I don't know of anybody 
that would. 
See Letter from Tracy to Robert; Addendum Exhibit "F". 
Each letter begins with a statement of Tracy's intent to waive his beneficial 
interest in the Trust. Tracy then mentions the Wavier and Assignment, states that he does 
not remember whether he signed it, and then poses a rhetorical question to convince 
Phillip and Robert that he did not sign the Waiver and Assignment. 
This attempt to convince Phillip and Robert that he did not sign the Waiver and 
Assignment, however, does not constitute a revocation of his contemporaneous waiver of 
his beneficial interest in the Trust. In fact, after posing the rhetorical question casting 
doubt on whether he signed the Wavier and Assignment, Tracy confirmed his intent to 
waive his interest in the Trust at the end of his letter to Phillip when he stated, "Like I 
said, I'm not going to do anything about the estate." See Letter from Tracy to Phillip; 
Addendum Exhibit "E". 
As a result, Tracy waived both his beneficial interest in the Trust and the claims he 
is now asserting against Phillip for breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy either 
when he signed the Wavier and Assignment or when he signed and sent the letters to 
Phillip and Robert. 
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C. Mutual Modification of the Trust 
Tracy correctly points out that a trust may be modified or revoked solely by the 
settlors of the trust if the power to do so is reserved by the terms of the trust. See Tracy's 
Reply Brief at 9. Tracy also correctly points out that in this case the power of the settlors, 
Don and Barbara Southwick (hereinafter "Don and Barbara"), to unilaterally modify the 
Trust was not reserved in the Trust Agreement. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 9-10; 
Addendum Exhibit "E". However, these points are irrelevant since Phillip's argument is 
that the Trust was mutually modified by the settlors and all of the beneficiaries, not that it 
was unilaterally modified by Don and Barbara. 
In addition to the power of the settlors to unilaterally modify or revoke a trust 
when that power is reserved by the trust instrument, "[a] noncharitable, irrevocable trust 
may be modified or terminated upon consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries, even if 
the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). This statute codified the 
well-settled common law "that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its 
continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) 
consent to its termination." See Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 n.2 (Utah 
1981); see also Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) (a trust may be 
terminated "where all the beneficiaries thereof consent"). 
The only argument advanced by Tracy to dispute that he was removed as a 
beneficiary of the Trust pursuant to a mutual modification of the Trust by the settlors and 
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beneficiaries is that "the [Wavier and Assignment] is not a consent to any modification" 
and the Joint Release "does not adversely affect any beneficiary other than Don." See 
Tracy's Reply Brief at 9-11. However, these arguments ignore the plain language of the 
Wavier and Assignment and the Joint Release. 
By executing the Joint Release, Don and Barbara agreed "to convey and transfer 
all of the assets located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary 
under the terms of [the Trust]." See Addendum Exhibit "C". In designating Barbara as 
the sole beneficiary, Don and Barbara necessarily agreed for Tracy to no longer be a 
beneficiary of the Trust. 
By executing the Wavier and Assignment, Tracy agreed to "renounce[] any claim 
he may have to any of the Trust." Tracy then directed the Trustee "to distribute [Tracy's] 
share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK" as if to punctuate his 
renunciation of his beneficial interest in the Trust. In renouncing his interest in the Trust, 
Tracy clearly agreed to no longer be a beneficiary of the Trust. 
Phillip affirmatively consented to the trust modification by accepting the Joint 
Release and the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of 
Fact 1fl[ 12,13, 17)]. Robert testified that he also affirmatively consented to the trust 
modification. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 273-274)]. Since everyone associated with 
the Trust affirmatively manifested consent to divest Tracy of his beneficial interest in the 
Trust, the Trust was modified by mutual consent and Tracy ceased thereafter to be a 
beneficiary of the Trust. 
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it AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROVNDS. 
The ability of the public to rely on judicial decrees is a fundamental principal of 
justice. Likewise, it would be manifestly unfair to subject a third party to liability for 
acting in accordance with a court order just because it was subsequently found to be 
flawed. "To [hold that a party cannot rely on a court order] would hi to . . . condemn 
parties to the instability of guessing which orders to abide and which orders to ignore. 
This will not do." In re Demos, 57 F.3d 1037, 1039 (11th Cir. 1995). 
Indeed, "[a]s a matter of logic and equity, it seems that a party should be able to 
rely upon orders of [the trial courts] without having to anticipate how those orders might 
be modified by subsequent action of the Supreme Court." Matter ofHeizer Corp., 1989 
WL 112547, *2 (Del. Ch. 1989) (unreported opinion). Accordingly, the courts have 
repeatedly refused to penalize parties for conducting themselves consistently with an 
order even when the court was not ultimately authorized to make the order. 
In one case, for example, "the trial court entered an order extending the time for 
filing the record." Murphy v. Dumas, 343 Ark. 608, 609 (Ark. 2001). Although the 
Arkansas Supreme Court found that the "extension order was void and of no effect," it 
declined to punish the party that had relied on the trial court's error: 
[W]e are reluctant to dismiss an appeal when the appellants relied on an order of 
the trial court, albeit an erroneous order, which gave them until January 29, 2001, 
to file their record.. . . We have held in the past that parties are entitled to rely on 
a trial court's order extending time even when the trial court may later vacate the 
order or when a judgment was erroneously entered. This principal should apply to 
the facts of this case. 
Id. at 610 (internal citations omitted). 
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In this case, Tracy would have Phillip held liable for breaching a fiduciary duty to 
Tracy by not treating Tracy as a Trust beneficiary. He argues that the Decree of Divorce 
did not and could not amend the Trust or otherwise terminate Tracy's interest in the Trust 
without Tracy's consent. See Tracy's Reply Brief at 12-15. However, these arguments 
ignore the fact that the Decree of Divorce purported to do just that by directing "the 
Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. 
Southwick the sole beneficiary of the assets of the trust as her sole and separate 
property." [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 8); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum 
Exhibit "B"]. 
To treat Tracy as a beneficiary would have been inconsistent with the Decree of 
Divorce and the steps subsequently taken by the Southwicks, including Tracy,4 to comply 
with the Decree of Divorce.5 Holding Phillip liable for complying in good faith with a 
flawed court order would be unjust. Consequently, the trial court's judgment—that Tracy 
4
 It is interesting to note that Tracy also conducted himself in accordance with the Decree 
of Divorce by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact \ 
15); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. It is disingenuous for Tracy to 
now argue that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on the Decree of Divorce, Don & 
Barbara's Joint Release, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment, and Tracy's Letters. 
5
 If the Court finds that it was reasonable for Phillip to rely on the Decree of Divorce, it 
must also find that it was reasonable for Phillip to comply with the request made by 
Barbara for Phillip and Robert to maintain their status as beneficiaries of the Trust since 
it would have been reasonable for Phillip to believe that Barbara was the sole owner of 
the property and/or beneficiary of the Trust and could therefore do as she pleased with 
the Trust and its assets. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 338 (1959); R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact f 9). 
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is a beneficiary of the Trust but that he is not entitled to claim an interest in pre-
Complaint distributions or to assert that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties—should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court conclude 
that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution 
of the Waiver and Assignment and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert. In the 
alternative, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court: (1) affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy; and (2) find that the trial 
court's conclusion that Phillip suffered a detriment by relying on Tracy's statements was 
supported by evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisZ^ay of September, 2010. 
SMI i i IKNOWLK; ; r.c. 
M 
* \ 3 s p l i e f i F.Noel 
Garrett A. Walker 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Phillip D. Southwick 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APELLANT, postage prepaid, to the 
following this '2^ day of September, 2010: 
Matthew G. Grimmer 
Erin T. Middleton 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
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Addendum Exhibit A 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
DON B. SOUTHWICK and BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK of 911 North 
Tiemont Street, Tremonton, Box Elder County, Utah, hereinafter 
referred to as the Trustors, hereby transfer and assign in Trust 
to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK of 1150 S. 660 W.
 r Tremonton, Utah 
84337, hereinafter referred to as the Trustee, the property 
described in Schedule "A,f attached hereto. 
All property now or hereafter subject to the provisions of.' 




1- Lifetime of Trustors. During the lifetime of tho 
Trustors, the Trustee shall-pay to the Trustors, for their 
benefit, such amounts from the principal or income of I he Trust 
Estate as they shall from time to time direct. 
2* Incapacity of Trustors. In the event the Trusters slm.ll 
become physically or mentally incapacitated to an extent tint 
they cannot conveniently attend to their own affairs, Trusts 
shall pay to them or apply for their benefit, such sums from 
income or principal as he shall determine in his sole '1 i.scral:.KMi 
is necessary or desirable to provide for Trustors1 care, support, 
and maintenance. 
3. Death of Trustors. Upon the death of the Trustors, Urn 
rrustee shall pay out of the income and/or principal of the Tr«i*:i: 
Estate the expenses of the last illness and funeral, of: \hn 
Trustors and any debts of the Trustors to the extent that otli'M 
provisions shall not have been made for the payment of su<:h 
expenses or debts. 
4« Distribution After Payment of Debts» Upon the death of: 
the Trustors, the Trustee, after payment of all expenses of last 
illness and funeral of the Trustors and any debts of tho 
Trustors, shall distribute the balance of the Trust Estnln 
including income and/or principal, all cash including bmil: 
accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies to 
Trustors1 sons, PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK of 1150 S. 6G0 W., 
Tremonton, Utah 84-337, ROBERT S. MILNER of 810 Cottonwood Drive, 
South Weber*, Utah 84405, and TRACY L. SOUTHWICK of 150 Jcr'-my' 
Street,.Salt Lake City, Utah* 
In the event Trustors1 said children should predecease f IK* 
Trustors or die prior tp the distribution of the Tru.^ t propoi'v, 
leaving issue surviving them, their share in the Trust R.nim-
shall go to their lawful issue by right of representation. 
ARTICLE II 
Rights Reserved by Trustors 
!• Neither the Trustors or any person on behalf. 
Trustors, may alter, amend or revoke this Trust in whole cu 
part •during the lifetime of the Trustors, during Incompetency 
the Trustorsf or after the death 'of the Trustors* 
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2. Adding to Trust. The Trustors at any time, or from, tim^ 
to time, or by testamentary disposition may add to this TniM: 
other property which, when accepted by the Trustee, shall become 
a part of the Trust Estate to be held in trust under the temw 
and provisions of this Agreement. 
3. Restrictions on Sale and Reinvestment. l.uirJng Hi" 
lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall make no saJe or ol-In-
disposition of any property of the Trust Estate and make tin 
investment of any money held in the said Ttust Estate except nr* 
shall be designated in writing by the Trustors. Fiovid'Hl, 
however, that in the event of the incompetency of the Trustors, 
this paragraph shall not apply and the Trustee shall exercise lus 
discretion without the written consent of the Trustors. 
ARTICLE III 
Powers of the Trustee 
To carry out the purposes of this Trust and subject to any 
limitations stated elsewhere in this instrument, the .Trustor* 
shall have all the powers presently granted to Trustees under thn 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 75-7-402, in addition to any 
powers hereafter conferred by law and including the following 
powers 1 
1- Limitation on Investments. To invest the Trust Entat9 
only in secured savings accounts and/or'certificates of deposit 
in banks or savings and loan associations in which tiic deposits 
are insured by the Federal Goverrmient unless otherwise authorized 
by the Trustors. 
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2, Payment of Expenses» To pay taxes, assessments and all 
.other expenses incurred in the administration of the Trur*t Estate 
and the protection thereof against legal or equitable attack, 
including counsel fees and reasonable compensation for his own 
services, 
3. Determination of Principal and Income, To determine 
What is principal and income of the Trust Estate and apportion 
and allocate, in his discretion, receipts and disbursements as 
between these accounts except insofar as the Trustee shall 
exercise the discretion herein conferred, and except as otherwjsc 
provided in this instrument, matters relating to principal nw.\ 
income shall be governed by the provisions of the Utah Uhlfoim 
Principal and Income Act from time to time existing. 
4« M2. Bond Required* No Trustee or successor Trust*™, 
hereunder, shall be required to give any bond or other soeuiity 




1. Accrual of Income and Proration of Expenses. lii'yw 
accrued or unpaid on trust property when received in*o the Tiu.'-e 
shall be treated as any other income. Income accrued or h"l«i 
undistributed by the Trustee at the termination of any intnrc-f-
or estate under this Trust shall go to the beneficiaries no::t 
entitled to the next eventual interest in the proportions in 
which they take such interest, 
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2. Motice to Trustee, Until the Trustee shall receive 
written notice of any birth, death or other event upon which Lli". 
right to payment from this Trust may depend, the Trustee shall 
incur no liability for the disbursements or principal or income 
made in good faith to persons whose interest may have been 
affected by that event, 
3« Beneficiaries under Disability. When any beneficiary 
entitled to teceive payments is, a minor, or in the judgment of 
the Trustee, is mentally or physically incompetent, irrespective 
of whether so legally adjudicated, the Trustee, in his 
discretion, may expend or apply any such payments for the benefit 
of such beneficiaries or, in case of a minor beneficiary, may 
make such payments to the parents of the beneficiary ou to the 
guardian of the beneficiary or to the person or persons with whom 
such beneficiary then resides. Sums necessary for support and 
education may be paid directly to minor beneficiaries who, in the 
judgment of the Trustee, have attained sufficient age and 
discretion to render it probable that the monies will be 
properly expended. 
4. Survivorship of Beneficiaries. In the event any 
beneficiary of the Trust created by this Trust Agreement shall 
die prior to the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days from 
the date of the event entitling such beneficiary to benefits, 
then for the purposes of such Trust it shall be deemed that such 
beneficiary did not survive such event and the Trust properties 
shall be administered and distributed as though suck bRneJSSI^^Si 
had predeceased such event. 
5
« Spendthrift Provision, Each and every beneficiary under 
this Trust is hereby restrained from, and are and shall be 
without right, power or authority to sell, transfer, mortgage, 
pledge, hypothecate, anticipate or in any other manner effect or 
impair his, her, or their beneficial or legal rights, titles, 
interests, claims, and estates in and to the income and/or 
principal of this Trust during the entire term, hereof; nor shall 
the rights, titles, interests, claims, or estates of any such 
beneficiary be subject to the rights or claims of creditors nor 
subject nor liable to the process of law or court* 
6. Designation of Trustee. It is understood and agreed 
that said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK shall act as Trustee so long as UQ 
is living and competent. In the event of the death or 
incompetency of said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK., ROBERT S. MXLllRR of: 
BIO Cottonwood Drive, South Webet, Utah 84405 and TRACT I,, 
SOUTHWICK of 150 Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall b-
•appointed as successor Co-Trustees by a court of comprint 
jurisdiction. 
7. Trustee Entitled to Expenses and Compensation. Th" 
Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and reasonable 
compensation for services performed as Trustee, to be paid ft"in 
the Trust Estate, 
8. Definitions, The words "child11, "children" and "is.™-" 
as used herein, shall include .legally adopted children. The word 
"issue" shall also include lineal descendants indefinitely. 
The words "Trustee or Trustees" are used interchnngnbiy and 
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Trustees and a,,* successor « """"" 
mG a n „ orisinai ™ s t " " IrU S t S 
Trustee or Trustees.
 I £ » „ pI»«l=i'» »! 
„H Is unenforceable, 
this Agreement Is un 
vhsless *e carried into effect.
 acceptcd by 
nevertheless o ^ i a T r U St has been acc-t 
» • ^ ^ ^ ^ l , , , and uniess otherwise, ^ c d 
the Trustee in the State of « » . alld B l l r,,hts 
under it shaU »° °°"°™°d »
 wn ,. solm>WI« «« B*"*"
1 
I H «THKSS «HERK0r. * , • ^ d u p U c i t e u a . 
,. soUWICK, have executed this , 
\ 2 ^ day of 
1989 .at 





s s . STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY O f ^ B ^ I
 i 9 8 9_ p e r s o n a l l y „„ . . - . 
on the ^ « or - ^
 s o „ W I t t , Ulc .!,.«.. 
b e £ o r e « DON B. 800THKICIL and B»WWA 
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
ffpT/ CCV.T-S1CH V I . 
suswin.PUK'.w J 
— x ;uLi^or.i iT)} 
^f^liTO^gJ^ft Expires: 
VyV^O 
KOTAEJ^ PUBLIC ( }
 # • 
Residing at \cj L\tN,v^x
 t\ W 
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SCHEDULE "A" 
ATTACHED TO THE SOUTHWICK FAMILY TRUST 
Dated September 13, 1989 
p 1. 11.93 Acres farm land located in Lehi, Utah County, Utah and 
^ more particulary described as follows: 
Commencing at a point 13 chains West and 4.54 chains South 
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 
20, Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence East 5.75 chains; thence South 20.75 
chains; thence West 5.75 chains; thence North 20.75 chains 
to the point of beginning. 
Together with six (6) shares of the Capital Stock of the 
Spring Creek Irrigation Company. 
.. 2; 26 acres range land"located in Utah County, Utah and more 
<$&/ particularly described as follows: 
The North 26 acres of the East Half of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 3 West of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridan. 
^ 3 . 80 acres range land located in Utah County, Utah and more 
^ particularly described as follows: 
NW1/4 of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM; & SW1/4 
of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM. Area 80 acres. 
4. Residence located at 911 North Tremont, Tremonton, Box Elder 
County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 16, Block 2, Amended Plat W, Tremonton Townsite Survey, 
Box Elder County, Utah, according to the official plat 
thereof. 
Subject to any taxes or assessments now or hereafter levied 
by any taxing unit. 
SUBJECT TO a first mortgage to the First Security Bank of 
Utah,. National Association for $14,65.0.00 dated October 3, 
1961 in the office of the County Recorder of Box Elder 
County, Utah October 9, 1961 in Book 153 of Mortgage Records 
at Page 110, which mortgage the grantees agree to assume and 
pay in accordance with the terms thereof. 
^ 5 . 11.5 acres farm land and minor subdivision at Tremonton, Box 
ftpy Elder County, Utah and more particularly described as 
follows: 
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Beginning at a point on the North right of way line of a 
frontage road 1045*3 feet East along the section line and 
284.2 feet North of the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N./ 
R. 3 W,, SLB&M said point being on the grantor's East line, 
and running North 57* 31f 30" West along said frontage road 
line 530.9 feet; thence Northwesterly 235,6 feet along the 
arc of a 539.96 foot radius curve to the right along said 
line; thence North 32* 31' 30" West 38.0 feet along said 
line; thence North 306.0 feet; thence North 1* 44' West 
226.0 feet; thence North 87* 15f East 607.5 feet; thence 
South 1* 44f East 1047.3 feet to the point of beginning, 
containing 11.50 acres. 
There are four (4) lots along the bottom of the above 11.50 
acres more particularly described as follows: 
LOT JL 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and 284.2 feet North 
from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M 
and running N 57*31,30rf W along said line 168.37 feet; 
thence N 10*00 f00,f E /381.93 feet'; thence 575*00'00" E 63.40 
feet; thence S 1*44' E 450.00 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 1.00 acre, reserving an easement for a 
drainage ditch 10 feet wide along the East side. 
LOT 2 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 168.37 feet from the 
S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W. , SLB&M to the 
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W along said 
line 134.10 feet; thence N 10*00'00" E 321.38 feet; thence S 
84*17f00" E 124.26 feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 381.93 feet to 
the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre. 
LOT 3. 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30"-W 302.47 feet from the 
S.W. corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W,, SLB&M to the 
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W 125.00 
feet; thence 40.16 feet along a curve to the right of 40.0 
foot radius (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 28*45'45" W 
38.50 feet) thence North 213.00 feet; thence East 179.78 
feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 321.38 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 0.99 acre. 
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LOT A 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045*3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284,2 feet and thence N 57*31f 30" W 530.9 feet and thence N 
56*201 W 72.0 feet from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 
11 N. , R. 3 W., SLB&M to the true point of beginning and 
running 167.82 feet along a 539.96 foot radius curve to the 
right; (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 42*56*15" W 
167.15 feet) thence N 32*31f30u W 38.0 feet; thence North 
107.75 feet; thence East 200.00 feet; thence South 231.52 
feet; thence 90.76 feet along a 40.0 foot radius curve to 
the right to the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre. 
n 6. All that part beginning at a point on West right of way line 
fobs of County Road and the North right of way line of Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co, West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 33 
feet West of Southeast Corner of Northeast Quarter of 
Section 1, Township 11 North, Range 4 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 85* 25f West 188 feet 
along the Canal right of way, thence North 460.9 feet, 
thence North 86* 00f East 188 feet to the County Road right 
of way line, thence^South along said line to the point of 
beginning. EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
Beginning at a point on the West right of way line of the 
County Road and the North right of way line of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 
33 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section 1, thence North 85* 25f West 188 
feet along the Canal right of way, thence North 257.9 feet, 
thence North 86* 00! East 188 feet to the County Road right 
of way line, thence South along said line to the point of 
beginning. 
(£$1• Lot 47, Block 4, Beginning N. 0f and W. 8f of the S.E. Corner, 
k^ thence W. 16' , thence N. 3 1/21, thence E. 16', thence S. 
3 l/2! to P.O.B. 2 spaces, incl. P.M. in the Provo City 
Cemetery, 
n^<^8. Lot 1, Block 12, in the Lehi City Cemetery. 
/ 9 . Remaining interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
v
 between Don B. Southwick & Barbara P. Southwick, husband and 
wife, as the Sellers, and Ed Muir & Lorraine Muir, his wife, 
as the Buyers, dated March 1, 1979, marked Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. Including a 1958 house trailer, Make -
Vendale, Identification Number V-2906Y102. One used 
electric range. One 105,000 BTU gas furnace. Escrow is 




10. 1972 Ideal house trailer, S/N 1S3325 
11. 1975 GMC 1-ton farm truck, Model C35C35f VIN YCY335Z501303 
12. 1979 Luv pickup truck, VIN CRN1498285318 
13. 1987 Century Buick Sedan automobile, 1G4AL51WXH6418162 
14. 1972 two-horse trailer, Make - ROC, I.D. 710156HT 
15. John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 631171, approx. 45 years 
old 
16. John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 574169, approx. 55 years 
old 
17. 24 shares of capital stock in the Lehi Spring Creek 
Irrigation Company, Lehi, Utah. No. 30 
18. 20.80 shares in Bear River Water Distribution Company, 
Tremonton, Utah. No. 3589 
19. 85 shares in The Western States Machine Company. No. 1754 
20. Guns: 
300 Savage, S/N 558898 
300 Savage, S/N 397006 w/t scope 
308 Savage, S/N 1085641 w/t scope 
Remington 12 gauge, Model 870, S/N 394415V 
Marlin 22 rifle, Model 3 9-A 
Sharps rifle, 50 calibre, S/N C23407 (1948) 
Ruger pistol, 357 Mag., S/N 157-86346 
S&W 22 calibre pistol, S/N 116056 
S&W 357 Mag. calibre, Mod. 27-2, S/N N327396 
20 gauge Ranger shotgun, S/N 105-21 
22 rifle, Steven Model 56 
410 gauge shotgun, Stevens Model 59A 
12 gauge shotgun, Remington Model 10A 
21. 2 saddles made by Utahn Saddle Co., approx. 10 - 12 yrs. old 
1 youth saddle 
1 pack saddle 
2 each bridles, halters, ropes, chaps, and saddle bags 
22. Electric welder made by Forney and accessories 
23. Hand tools and wrenches 
24. 1966 Metro truck, Model 1200, S/N 551211L006182 
12 
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1 buckskin mare, born 1971, Lady Bar Deck 71, #887509 
1 black gelding, born 1975, Little Tomm Hawk, #1122182 
1 bay mare 
1 yearling buckskin gelding, born August 1988 
All cattle with Rafter S on left hip thigh- Brand and ear 
mark are registered to Don B. Southwick 
Bank Accounts: 
Logan Savings & Loan: #0303 60073915 
Logan Savings & Loan: #0203 60083711 
Sandia Federal Savings & Loan: #064 7010568 
Sandia Federal Savings & Loan: #061 3205050 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF B'OX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON B- SOUTHWICK, / 
Plaintiff, / 
vs • / 
BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK, / 
Defendant. / 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 900000252DA 
Judge F. L. Gunnell 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on 
the 18th-day of October, 1991, before the Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff not appearing 
in person, nor with his attorney, and the Defendant 
appearing in person and with her attorney, Pete iN. 
Vlahos, and Plaintiff's attorney having withdrawn as 
attorney for the Plaintiff by written Motion 'and Order 
and said Motion and Order was filed in open Court by the 
Defendant's attorney, and it having been shown to the 
Court that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of 
the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein the 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT NO. ,J? 
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Defendant having answered same within the time allotted 
by statute, and wherein the Stipulation of the parties 
herein settling all of their property rights, alimony, 
support, attorney fees, Court costs and other kindred 
matters, and more than three (3) months having elapsed 
from the date of the filing of the Complaint, and the 
testimony of the Defendant having been heard in open 
Court, and the Court having been fully informed in the 
premises. and having made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, NOW 
THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Barbara P. Southwick, is granted a Decree of 
Divorce from the Plaintiff, Don B". Southwick, same to 
become final upon the signing and entry. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein all 
matters of property rights, alimony, support, attorney 
fees, Court costs and other kindred matters that are 
contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties 
herein and same is set forth as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall direct 
the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, who resides at 1150 
South 660 West in Tremonton, Utah, to convey the 
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necessary documents that will convey all of the property 
presently in said trust to the Defendant, and that the 
Defendant shall be the recipient and the sole beneficiary 
under the Trust Agreement, and that the Plaintiff shall 
have no further right or claim as a beneficiary in the 
assets that have been placed in said Trust Agreement. 
2. That both parties jointly shall give written 
notice to the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do 
whatever i*? necessarv to remove the Plaintiff- Don B. 
Southwick, as a beneficiary under the Trust Agreement and 
make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of the 
assets in the trust as her sole and separate property. 
3. That the Plaintiff specifically acknowledges 
that the Defendant shall receive the following real" and 
personal property that is presently in the Trust 
Agreement as the sole beneficiary, and does convey all of 
his right, title and interest in and to the trust assets 
and waives any claim as a beneficiary thereunder. 
4. That said Trust Agreement includes the following 
real property, to-wit: 
(a) 11.93 acres of land, with 24 shares of 
irrigation water located in Lehi, Utah. 
(b) 80 acres of range land and 26 acres of range 
land located in West Canyon, Utah County, Utah. 
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(c) Lots 3 and 4 being part of 11.5 acres of land 
located at approximately 1100 South 850 West in 
Tremonton, Utah, including 4.96 hours of irrigation 
water. 
(d) The equity in the family home at 911 North 
Tremont located in Tremonton, Utah, which has an equity 
of $14,500.00, and the Plaintiff shall sell said home 
without any commission and shall bring all mortgage 
payments current to the date of sale, provided however 
Defendant shall vacate the home within thirty (30) days 
after the divorce is granted. That if the family home 
does not bring a net of $14,500.00 equity for the 
Defendant, the Plaintiff shall reimburse the Defendant 
from his own personal assets all sums up to $14,500.00 so 
that the Defendant shall receive a net equity of 
$14,500.00. 
(e) Five lots in Lot 1 BlocK 12, Lehi Cemetery. 
5. That Plaintiff shall assume the Nadine Peters7 
note of $26,000.00 for the 9 1/2 acres, with 9.54 hours 
of water, which is part of the 11.5 acres of land set 
forth in item (c) hereinabove. 
6. That the Plaintiff shall convey and do whatever 
is legally proper and necessary to convey to the 
Defendant all other items of real and personal property 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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as listed on the family Trust Agreement and all other 
items presently owned by the trust by and between the two 
(2) beneficiaries, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, designated as Plaintiff and Defendant 
respectively herein. That the Plaintiff shall further 
convey to the Defendant all items of real and personal 
property, except as to those items he shall retain that 
is not included in the trust and all items of real and 
property included in the trust to the Defendant as her 
sole and separate property. 
7. That the Plaintiff shall receive as his sole and 
separate property all of his clothes, small personal 
items, such as toiletries, etc., and that the Plaintiff 
is also awarded the 1980 Luv pickup truck as his sole and 
separate property. 
8. That the Plaintiff shall manage and take care of 
the business building until the bank makes a decision as 
to the disposition and said agreement is finalized and 
further shall defend any lawsuit sought by the bank for 
the foreclosure on said property. That the Plaintiff 
shall be entitled to receive the rental income during the 
interim and shall also manage said business building 
until that matter is disposed of, either by foreclosure 
or sale, and the Plaintiff shall divide the rental income 
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from the building equally between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, minus the reasonable expenses necessary in 
maintaining the building, which the Plaintiff shall 
furnish the Defendant a full accounting of, 
9. That the Plaintiff shall further pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $145.00 per month as and for 
alimony, payable each month on or before the 15th day of 
the month, commencing with the month of October. That in 
addition, shall pay to the Defendant a proportionate 
increase of his social security benefits as additional 
alimony as he receives any additional payments in his 
social security, and that the intent is to attempt to 
equalize the income the parties are receiving for marital 
assets, provided however the alimony shall terminate upon 
the death of the Defendant or the Defendant's remarriage. 
10. That the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant's 
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, the sum of $500.00 as and for 
partial attorney fees for the preparation of the 
Stipulation, plus presenting the matter to the Court and 
preparing the subsequent papers granting to the parties 
the divorce. 
11. That the Defendant further shall bring current 
and pay the property taxes on the 11.5 acres of land 
located in Tremonton and on the land located in Utah 
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County, said taxes shall be for the years 1990 and 1991. 
12. That the Plaintiff shall further provide to the 
Defendant the necessary cash at the execution of the 
Stipulation, to bring current the delinquent house 
payments on the family home, which is located at 911 
North Tremont in Tremonton, Utah. 
13. That the Defendant shall utilize the trust 
properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency that 
might arise from the business building, which is 
presently being foreclosed upon, if the trust properties 
are still in existence at the time of the final judgment 
and shall utilize said assets if they are in existence 
and if the Defendant has control over said trust 
properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency on the 
pending foreclosure, provided however that if she does 
not have any control over the assets in the trust, then 
she would not be obligated to satisfy said foreclosure 
judgment if one does occur. 
14. That each of the parties shall sign whatever 
papers are legally necessary to effectively transfer the 
interest that each is to receive in connection with this 
agreement and upon failure to do so, the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement shall serve as the full 
agreement between the parties and shall serve as an 
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effective and complete transfer of all assets that each 
party is to receive under the terms of the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement. 
15. That the Defendant shall assume and discharge 
all other attorney fees she owes to her attorney, other 
than the amount that the Plaintiff is contributing 
herein. 
16. That Plaintiff shall assume and discharge his 
own attorney fees and costs. 
y / MOV , 
DATED this y day of Qotobor, 1991, 
F. L. GUNNELL, 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce was posted in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Don 
B. Southwick, Plaintiff, at 6th North 100 West, 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 on this p" day of October, 
1 9 9 1 . 
i<sm (/ra WaAw Secretary 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
o«Trifcvrc'i-; 
^ L . u I . - 5 \ 
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IN EVIDENCE . 
[CLERK 
Mr. Phillip D. Southvick 
1050 South 660 West 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Re: Southwick vs. Southwick 
My File: 400-V 
Comes now the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, beneficiaries under that Trust Agreement dated 
September 13, 1989 and which was signed in Tremonton, Utah, and 
hereby direct said Trustee to convey and transfer all of the assets 
located in said trust to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole 
beneficiary under the terms of said Trust Agreement, 
That the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, direct the Trustee to do whatever is legally necessary 
to remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that 
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole 
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement hereinabove 
designated= 
That both parties acknowledge they have a copy of the Trust 
Agreement and that the direction being made to the Trustee is based 
on the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into 
by and between Don B* Southwick as Plaintiff and Barbara P, 
Southwick as Defendant in a pending divorce action, located in the 
First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
bearing civil number 900000252DA. 
That this letter is signed by both beneficiaries and directed 
to the Trustee pursuant to their rights under the Trust Agreement. 
DATED this \ \ day of October, 1991. 
%S^£l_£L 
DON" B. SOUTHWICK, 





Udee. &U n&- J<y <fJ^fL—./ /??/„ 
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! DEFENDANT! 
jawainia • fr: 
January 24, 1992 g g . 
JJJUWL j . 
Mr, Phillip D. Southwick 
1050 South 660 West 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Re: Don B* Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick Trust 
Dear Mr. Southwick: 
Comes now the undersigned, TRACY L, SOUTHWICK, beneficiary under 
that Trust Agreement dated September 13, 1989 which was signed in 
Tremonton, Utah, and hereby renounces any claim he may have to 
any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all 
cash including bank accounts, and all proceeds from life 
insurance policies and further directs said Trustee to distribute 
his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK. 
DATED this 3 f day of January, 1992, 
yTRApY L. SOUTHWICK 
Berieficiary 
Approved and Accepted by the undersigned as Trustee this 
day of jm^JucA. . 1992. 
\J6 D. r PHILLJT . SOUTHWICK 
Trustee 
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